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Researchers have struggled to explain the dramatic increasein diagnoses of ‘depression’ in the industrialised world.This paper argues that psychological distress is likely to
arise within an ecological context that is becoming increasingly
degraded, and in which the character of selfhood is being rede-
fined to fit an industrialised context. In turn, these redefinitions
of selfhood reduce our capacity to address ecological concerns. I
argue that it is only possible to recognise the connections between
human well-being and ecological health if we identify and chal-
lenge the dissociations and repressions on which the ‘business as
usual’ of industrial society depends, and that a more embodied
conception of the person is fundamental to this recovery of our
wholeness. More specifically, I argue that our current reliance on
cognition and our corresponding marginalisation of sensing and
feeling, in addition to undermining human well-being, may be
ecologically catastrophic. 
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Psychological health and the natural environment
Over the past half century or so, indices of psychological distress
in the United States and Western Europe have risen markedly,
with rates of depression and anxiety showing a particularly steep
rise (Wickramaratne, Weissman, Leaf, and Holford, 1989; Cross-
National Group, 1992; Hagnell, Lanke, Rorsman, and Öjesjö,
1982). While the diagnostic categories on which such findings are
based will rightly be viewed with suspicion by critical psycholo-
gists, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that a continuing
deterioration in psychological well-being has occurred despite a
steady increase in material affluence. While researchers have often
recognised the contributions of such factors as family breakdown,
loss of communal links, and a more competitive occupational
environment (Lane, 2000; Kasser, 2002) in bringing about this
deterioration, the continuing destruction of the natural world has
seldom been considered as possibly impacting human psycholog-
ical well-being. The dearth of evidence in this area may reflect the
prior assumptions of researchers about which factors to pay atten-
tion to as much as any lack of relation: as Stephen Kellert (2002,
p118) remarks, one ‘wonders if the relative absence of published
material on this subject may be indicative of a society so estranged
from its natural origins it has failed to recognise our species’ basic
dependence on nature as a condition of growth and development’.
Similarly, John Schumaker (2001, p157) has suggested that
modern society is ‘characterised by a collective dissociative
amnesia that involves a complete forgetting of the human-nature
relationship’. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the reasons
for this lack of attention and to explore the implications of what
may be a largely unrecognised link between psychological health
and the state of the natural world. I do so from a critical realist
perspective which, while accepting that our interpretations and
experience of natural phenomena are considerably influenced by
cultural variations, insists on the reality of a natural order which
exists independently of knowledge, language, and experience
(Benton, 2001; Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson, and Norrie,
1998). My approach also incorporates the focus on embodied expe-
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rience which is emphasised in David Smail’s (2005) ‘social mate-
rialist’ approach to psychological distress. 
There are several possible reasons why any relation between
psychological health and environmental degradation might go
unnoticed. Not least, the marked specialisation and fragmentation
that is characteristic of industrial life ensures that environmental
issues are dealt with separately from psychological problems,
drawing on separate disciplines, involving different administra-
tive departments, and understood by means of separate theoretical
frameworks. As Kleinman, Das, and Lock (1996, p xix) put it, ‘the
phenomenon of suffering as an experiential domain of everyday
social life has been splintered off into measurable attributes.
These attributes are then managed by bureaucratic institutions
and expert cultures that reify the fragmentation while casting a
veil of misrecognition over the whole’. Thus human fulfilment or
distress are considered, if at all, simply as psychiatric or personal
issues, both by a corporate realm which treats them as ‘externali-
ties’ having little importance compared to the balance sheet, and
by environmental researchers who often feel pressured to focus on
less ‘subjective’ realms such as ecology or population dynamics.
Consequently, the environmental debate tends to exclude those
qualities of nature which cannot be expressed technically, tacitly
assuming a rationally construable ‘environment’ inhabited by
cognitively active but unfeeling individuals who relate to it simply
in terms of its material ‘affordances’. A strong case can be made
that an effective critical psychology will need to adopt an ecolog-
ical, naturalistic stance which can re-integrate these splintered
components of the world.
Related to this problem is the difficulty of identifying and
researching those pervasive background characteristics which,
arguably, colour and infuse the entirety of our relation to the
world, and so are difficult to link with any specific form of
pathology. For example, growing up within industrial society is
viewed as largely a process of differentiation from the world (Kidner,
2001; Searles, 1960) – a differentiation that is compounded by the
shrinkage of the ‘commons’ and the corresponding expansion of
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areas that are privately owned, commercially exploited, or built
on. This differentiation, however, is usually taken as a normal,
necessary part of growing up, and so is not recognised or
researched as potentially problematic. Although it is not easy to
investigate such pervasive influences on our well-being, we should
not underestimate the child’s need to grow up into a world that is
taken for granted as basically good and healthy, conveying the
sense that our role in the broad scheme of things is positive and
constructive. These conditions exist in many indigenous societies,
the natural environment simply being understood as ‘home’, and
as good, nurturant, even parental. Growing up in these societies is
a matter of growing into this world, learning from it, and locating
one’s life within natural processes and structures (Ingold, 2000;
Rival, 1993). The knowledge that whatever our own personal
problems, or the ineptitude, corruption, or blunders of whole soci-
eties, there is somewhere ‘out there’ a natural realm within which
one can find refuge, renewal and certainty, is a fundamental source
of ontological security. W. H. Auden (1966, 218), for example, after
describing the corruption and decay that permeated the collapsing
Roman Empire, ends the poem:
Altogether elsewhere, vast
Herds of reindeer move across
Miles and miles of golden moss,
Silently and very fast.
Today, however, both the ‘miles and miles of golden moss’ and the
‘vast herds of reindeer’ are under threat; and this deterioration in
the natural context is likely to cast a long shadow over our identi-
ties and over the meaning of our lives. If we lose sight of our roots
within the wild world, then these identities themselves become
precarious; and we fall prey to glossy commercial substitutes.
Such felt but unspoken losses therefore become a tacitly accepted
part of the ‘human condition’, a dimly intuited ‘fall’ from which
we spend our lives trying to recover, a guilt we can never quite
grasp or expiate; and the origins of our emotional distress remain
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obscure, slipping through the methodological net used by most
research. 
Despite the paucity of research exploring this issue, there is
reason to believe that its significance has been underestimated.
For example, Robert Ryan (2000) found in a study of people’s rela-
tionships with an urban natural area that ‘the loss of a special tree,
changes in management, or increased development … can have a
negative effect on people who have an attachment to natural
areas’, although the resulting ‘loss or grief is not always verbally
expressed’. The psychological impact of the destruction of a tree
may even be compared to that of bereavement; as one Colorado
farmer said, ‘it’s like losing a kid’ (Sommer, 2003). These feelings
of loss, because they do not correspond to a cognitively, legally, or
economically recognised loss, are difficult to express in dominant
forms of discourse. Conventionally, if we do not ‘own’ the tree, we
cannot experience any ‘loss’ if it is cut down. Such losses, in other
words, are already built into our economic system, and so seem to
reflect ‘the way the world is’. Felt relations, then, inhabit a
twilight realm of the already half-lost and the cognitively aban-
doned, which makes their final loss more difficult to recognise or
mourn; and one of the tasks of the critical psychologist is to drag
this twilight realm back into consciousness so that we can reclaim
our full identities as beings who are simultaneously social and
natural. 
How we dissociate the self and the world
This view that feelings and non-material relations are secondary
and insubstantial qualities compared to material ‘things’ that can
be ‘owned’ is invariably not shared by non-industrial peoples, who
generally prioritise relation rather than the ‘self-containedness’ of
isolated entities. For example, Tim Ingold (2001, p149), reviewing
indigenous attitudes to the natural world, criticises the view that 
things exist, in the real world, independently of their relations. The
relational model overturns this understanding. To exist, it asserts, is
already to be positioned in a certain environment and committed to
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the relationships this entails. Reality, then, is relational through and
through. The relational field is no abstraction but the very ground
from which things grow … Another word for this ground is land. …
In a relational model … ‘kinship is geography’.
From this perspective, there is no ontological discontinuity
between self and land: self reaches out empathically over the land,
which in turn is experienced as an extension of self. Consequently,
as Edward Casey (1993, p35) says of the Dineh, ‘to take away land
is to take away life … the major cause of illness is not something
“physical” or “psychological” in the usual bifurcated Cartesian
senses of these words, but instead the loss of the landed place
itself ’. In other words, if we recognise the prior unity that lies
beneath this Cartesian ontological split between an insubstantial
subjectivity and an objectivity that is shorn of its relational and
affective dimensions, we will reject the physicalist language of a
solely material loss, recognising instead that the loss of land is
intrinsically psychological as well as material. From this point of
view, what we dispassionately describe as ‘environmental damage’
can be seen as inherently distressing and damaging to selfhood.
Dominant industrialist discourses cannot articulate this, however,
often preferring relativist interpretations of change as ‘natural or
inevitable’, ‘necessary for economic growth’, and so on.
Consequently, the nature and origins of our distress remain
hidden from us, and it becomes ‘free floating’, unanchored to any
recognisable ‘cause’. This, as Freud (1963, p245) pointed out, is a
recipe for ‘depression’, since ‘melancholia is in some way related
to an object loss which is withdrawn from consciousness, in
contradistinction to mourning, in which there is nothing about
the loss that is unconscious’. 
The individualist and materialist emphases of our technolog-
ical age have made us slow to recognise the centrality of relations
of all kinds to the functioning of natural systems, including those
in which we participate. Only during the past sixty years has there
been a belated recognition that children derive their sense of
emotional security largely from their dependent relationship with
128 critical psychology
CriticPsychol 19.qxd  22/05/2007  14:56  Page 128
caregivers, and that this relationship is itself ‘nested’ in a prior
and on-going dependence of the caregiver on the Earth itself
(Mann, 2005). More recently, physicians have begun to appreciate
the importance of friends and kin for cardiovascular health. Only
in the past two decades, however, have studies appeared demon-
strating the link between contact with the natural world, on the
one hand, and physical and emotional health, on the other. For
example, Peter Kahn (1999) reviews numerous studies showing
that humans prefer to look at natural rather than built landscapes,
and at paintings depicting natural rather than abstract composi-
tions; that natural landscapes promote a sense of physiological
well-being; that prison inmates whose cells looked out onto
nearby farmlands and forests needed less healthcare services than
inmates whose cells looked out onto the prison yard; and that the
presence of a picture of a natural scene including water reduced
the blood pressure of presurgical patients by ten to fifteen points.
Other studies have shown that contact with nature (as opposed to
a visual representation of nature) has a range of psychological and
physical benefits (Kaplan and Kaplan, 1989). 
Because the mechanisms underlying such findings remain
mysterious, they have not entered the mainstream of thinking on
human health. In many other cultures, the restorative quality of
the natural world is taken as given, as part of the fabric of human-
life-in-the-world (Brody, 2000; Nuttall, 1992; Nabhan, 1997). The
anthropologist Robert Williamson (2002, pp189-190), for example,
who has lived and worked extensively among the Inuit of
northern Canada, who were often so badly damaged by forced
acculturation in mission schools, tells how 
The most restorative factor was the habitat. It has always been
there, waiting for the soul-drained need of the hurt Inuit to move
again into its ambit, returning to the places where the old souls
were also waiting to be invoked. I remember an aeroplane landing
on the ice near a hunting camp, returning some people from
hospital. Among them was a young hunter, his hospital pallor
contrasting with the bronze spring-time glow of the faces greeting
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the new arrivals. He asked about the whereabouts and situation of
his family. Sadly, the people told him his wife had died during his
two-year absence in the sanatorium, and their two children sepa-
rately sent to a missionary residential school.
He spoke earnestly to the owner of a dog-team that had come
out to meet the plane, a kinsman’s concern and understanding
written on his features. And right there and then, straight from
the aircraft onto the ice, he drove the borrowed team off into the
surrounding country, promising to return in a few days. He drove
that team non-stop, except for pauses to rest the dogs and hunt for
them – for two days and two nights, and did not sleep until the
third day. As we watched him heading over the ice and up the
coast until he was out of sight, we understood.
Sometimes, conventional understandings do not merely ignore
relations between well-being and ecological conditions, but
actually invert them. For example, Jack Manno (2000, p182)
points out that groups such as nomads and hunter-gatherers who
make their own clothing, gather their own food, and so on will
appear statistically as ‘poor’ because they have little measurable
income. As they become assimilated into the industrial economy
– as factory workers, for example – their ‘income’ will tend to
increase; so that an apparent alleviation of poverty occurs as their
lives actually become impoverished due to destruction of the
natural environment and of the cultural traditions that are inter-
woven with it. The distress that results from this tends to be
regarded as unconnected with these economic and environmental
changes: as Manno notes (2000, p124), ‘economic forces have
become so thoroughly enmeshed in the activities of daily living
that their injustices, particularly the destruction of the substance
of community life, become invisible as purposeful acts of oppres-
sion and instead are experienced as personal problems’. What is
happening here is that the intrinsic relation between well-being
and participation in a healthy eco-cultural context is being
wrenched apart, so that individual health is defined simply in
terms of economic criteria, and the social, ecological, and psycho-
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logical wreckage that results from this process is ignored. Manno
(2000, p127) adds that those qualities that cannot be expressed in
terms of economic criteria, such as ‘local connection, conviviality,
ecological attentiveness … are inherent human qualities, and their
gradual impoverishment by the free reign of commoditization
diminishes all human beings’. As one Inuit woman, Mary Adele,
expresses it: ‘On the land we are ourselves. In the settlement we
are lost. That was the way they made our minds weak’ (quoted by
Brody, 2000, p277). Thus the destruction of important sources of
well-being becomes invisible; and human welfare is redefined as
flowing directly from the same industrial domain that in many
ways undermines it. The destruction of the natural environment
of communities has been shown to be strongly associated with
reduced mental health (Desjarlais, Eisenberg, Good, and
Kleinman, 1995) and findings that certain ‘mental disorders’ are
rarer and have a better prognosis in non-industrial countries
(Kleinman, 1988) supports the interpretation that advanced
medical science may be a less than entirely adequate substitute for
a lost relational ecology. 
Reactions to loss 
These findings starkly illuminate the way current models of the
self – whether the individualistic, autonomous self of experi-
mental psychology or the more diffuse postmodern self,
constructed socially or by discourse – may diverge from people’s
lived experience; and to the extent that we accept such models, we
will seriously misconstrue human needs. Human capacities such
as spirituality, for example, are conventionally thought of either as
individual qualities that are largely independent of the ‘environ-
ment’, or as constructed through culture-specific discourses such
as religious dogmas. But especially in non-industrialised societies,
which invariably view spirituality not in idealist terms but as an
intrinsic quality of the world, many would agree with Roger
Brooke’s (1991, pp60-61) view that ‘the self is not an entity but a
capacity that emerges through the revelation of the world. The
spirituality of the self, for example, is a capacity that emerges
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through the world’s revelation as a temple …’. In other words, we
become spiritual beings by learning to recognise, value, and
engage with what is out there, just as we become loving beings by
recognising the loveliness of someone or something out there in
the world, reaching out to them and so extending our subjectivity
to include them. Conversely, if what is ‘out there’ is damaged,
cheapened, and commercialised, then subjectivity recoils, taking
refuge (emotionally and physically) within our islands of comfort,
reinforcing narcissism and abandoning the world to further
degradation. From this perspective, personal and ‘environmental’
problems are fundamentally the same problem; and a constricted
form of selfhood inevitably complements a reduced landscape. An
effective critical psychology should not accept this situation as
part of the taken-for-granted context within which it operates and
theorises, but should be prepared to envision healthier forms of
selfhood even when these are inconsistent with current social and
political conditions. 
The form of selfhood suggested by Brooke is more often
realised in non-industrial societies than in our own; and Brooke’s
statement, rather than being a description of contemporary
selfhood, might be better understood as a sort of wishful thinking
about the way we could be in a healthier world. From this perspec-
tive, both the industrialist self-as-autonomous-individual and the
postmodern socially constructed self appear as immature, seed-
like versions of the self, curiously cut off from their grounding in
all those worldly structures that could contribute to our healthy
development. If we take as given either of these undeveloped
versions of selfhood, then we ignore the prior, historical reduction
of the relational self, bracketing off those capacities that could
integrate us within a healthy ecology. Consequently, we become
oblivious to these relational capacities, since they were supposedly
– according to both ‘common sense’ and most contemporary
theory – never present in the first place. The fact that certain other
societies embody relational views does not make them necessarily
‘right’, of course; but it does show that selfhood can vary in
profound ways, and undermines the notion that our present
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assumptions about selfhood are somehow inevitable. This being
so, we may be justifiably sceptical about the understandings of
‘normality’ assumed by the most ecologically destructive society
the world has known.
On this basis, we can distinguish between acute and chronic
reactions to degradation of the environment. The acute reaction
has been most often noted in ‘undeveloped’ areas of the world, and
is characterised by an initial reaction of dismay and outrage when
some subjectively significant aspect of the natural world is
damaged or destroyed, followed by intense grieving, often accom-
panied by psychological deterioration and even suicide. This is in
essence the grief reaction that follows bereavement, since the
peoples concerned are quite clear about what has been lost; and it
has been extensively documented in anthropological studies of
peoples who have been driven off their land (Lassiter, 1987; Jilek,
1974; Jaimes, 1992). 
This reaction will be less apparent in the industrialised nations,
which possess social and ideological mechanisms designed to
deflect and reinterpret emotional reactions to the destruction of
nature. These mechanisms include the portrayal of destruction
positively in terms of ‘progress’ or ‘development’, geographical
separation from the landscape being destroyed, and the availability
of a wide range of consumer goods and forms of ‘entertainment’
that distract us from and superficially compensate for the loss of
less tangible and commodifiable necessities. Furthermore, contem-
porary socialisation and education emphasise a cognitive
understanding of the world in terms of abstractions and
‘resources’, so that, as we noted above, it is already ‘lost’ to many of
us in an emotional and cultural sense even before it is physically
destroyed, and a chronic, suppressed sense of loss becomes an
accepted part of our ‘personality’. In Martin Seligman’s (1990, p8)
terms, ‘an individualism without commitment to the commons
produces depression and meaninglessness on a massive scale’.
While we therefore avoid the acute grief reactions that occur
among indigenous peoples, we pay a more subtle price which also
includes the withering of our capacity to envision alternatives to
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industrialism, and a resigned acceptance that the past, present, and
future must necessarily be variations of the same ‘reality’.
Complementarily, the notion of a wild, unspoiled world is often
presented as an unrealistic ‘romantic fantasy’, constructed by
‘environmentalist discourses’. Wilderness, we are told, is a ‘product
of civilisation’, and any yearning for a wild world is denigrated as
‘nostalgia for a mythical golden age’ – a term that suggests an
immature desire for an unreal ‘Edenic vision’, implying that the
industrialised world is the only possible one. ‘Humanity’ is there-
fore redefined as industrial humanity, and humans everywhere and
at all times are portrayed as nascent capitalists (Hornborg, 2001,
p90), eagerly awaiting the arrival of industrial technology so that
they can take their place within the modern world – a view incor-
porated into the ‘modernisation’ theories of economic
development adopted by organisations such as the World Bank.
This constriction of historical awareness leads to what Kahn (1999)
has referred to as ‘environmental generational amnesia’ – the
repressive assumption that whatever environment we experience
in childhood is healthy – and constitutes a reduction of our envi-
ronmental and psychological imagination to the conditions which
prevail during our individual lifespans. 
This situation inevitably sows the seeds of discontent, anxiety,
and confusion. If a wild nature, supposedly, never existed and can
never exist in the future, then our grief is made to seem unreal and
inexplicable. This is the world we are in, supposedly; no other
world has ever existed, nor could it exist; and subjectivity should
adjust itself to fit this present world. Swim with the tide of indus-
trialist development: forget your childish dreams, your ancestral
traditions, and the feelings that stir within you; and allow yourself
to be defined by industrialism. Such views collude with those who
have an interest in both our historical amnesia and our difficulties
in imagining a non-corporate future. While we can mourn (and
perhaps take action to correct) a loss that we recognise and can
express, an unconscious loss is more likely to be diffused within
channels such as consumerism and addictive behaviour, aided and
abetted by the advertising industry. In Philip Cushman’s (1990,
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p600) words, the modern self ‘yearns to acquire and consume as an
unconscious way of compensating for what has been lost’. Such
dubious ‘solutions’ are unlikely to work for long, however; in
which case our sense of loss is likely to be understood as ‘depres-
sion’. As Gananeth Obeyesekere (1985, p148) asks, 
is it possible that sorrowful affect may not be capable of transfor-
mation into public meanings under certain circumstances? … it is
likely that in Western culture the affects of depression are not
given cultural meaning and significance because of … rationalisa-
tion in Western society and the demystification of the world. In
this situation, affects exist more or less in a free-floating manner,
awaiting a different symbolic formulation: their conceptualisation
as a disease, ‘depression’.
As an example of the rift between ‘public meanings’ and
‘sorrowful affect’, consider the situation of the individual who at a
conscious level absorbs the discourse of ‘individual freedom’ and
‘consumer choice’, but at a deeper level recognises that their
choices reflect social pressures induced largely by the media and
the advertising industry. Given the findings that a lack of control
over one’s life is associated with ‘depression’ and other psychoso-
cial problems (Seligman, 1975; Nelson and Prilleltensky, 2005),
this situation in which a conscious belief in one’s freedom
overlays an actual experience of lack of freedom is likely to lead to
‘inexplicable’ depressive feelings which may be interpreted as
reflecting personal inadequacy. ‘Depression’, then, appears as irra-
tional and unconnected with the external world; and the term
amounts to a sort of epistemological siding into which we shunt
those feelings that cannot be explained in terms of accepted ‘real-
ities’. Feeling and thinking have been ideologically separated, so
that a resigned, ‘rational’, acceptance of the inevitability of
‘business as usual’ within a continuously degrading world coexists
with ‘free floating’, inexplicable, feelings of ‘depression’ and
‘anxiety’. As James Hillman and Michael Ventura (1993, pp11–12)
argue, this ideological separation
depression and the natural world 135
CriticPsychol 19.qxd  22/05/2007  14:56  Page 135
converts my outrage – at the pollution or chaos or whatever my
outrage is about – into rage and hostility. … Therapy introverts
the emotions, calls fear ‘anxiety’. You don’t work psychologically
on what that outrage is telling you about potholes, about trucks, …
about burning up oil, about energy policies, nuclear waste, that
homeless woman over there with the sores on her feet …
Feelings of outrage, reinterpreted psychologically as ‘anxiety’ or
‘depression’, are thereby invalidated as a basis for action, so that a
failure to act, in another twist of this emotional vicious circle,
further exacerbates feelings of powerlessness. As Catherine Lutz
(1985, pp80, 88-89) points out: 
there is a strong block against viewing [depression] as reasonable,
as problem solving, or as rational. Like all emotions, depressive
feelings tend to be seen as disruptions, or barriers to under-
standing and rationality. … The person is split between
‘emotional’ responses to loss and ‘thoughtful’, rational, and
controlled reactions to it. Our ‘thoughts’ critically judge our
‘emotions’. This alienation of questions of value and feeling from
questions of ‘literal’ meaning implies that loss will tend to be
experienced in the West as an inner struggle between these two
ethnotheoretically postulated aspects of the self.
What has happened, then, is that the conflict between the living
world and industrialism has been concealed and mystified so that
it re-emerges as a psychological ‘inner struggle’ within the human
person. Humanity thus sits uncomfortably astride these two great
systems; and much of the ‘individual psychopathology’ we suffer
reflects the inconsistency between their demands. Theorists as
diverse as Freud (‘id’ versus ‘ego’), Carl Rogers (‘incongruence’
between the ‘self concept’ and ‘experience’), and the object rela-
tions school (‘libidinal ego’ versus the ‘central ego’) have
recognised this inconsistency; but they have tended to uncriti-
cally reproduce it as if it were an inevitable part of ‘human nature’.
Seemingly quite different approaches such as social construc-
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tionism also manage to avoid recognising the conflict between
industrialism and the natural order as a determinant of psycho-
logical distress, this time by defining selfhood as constructed by
social or linguistic context, so that any innate qualities of human
being which could conflict with the ‘social’ realm are defined out
of existence. None of these approaches, then, acknowledge both
the internal conflict and its source in an external schism; and so
they implicitly accept some variant of the industrialist story about
the triumph of ‘rationality’ and ‘democracy’ over ‘irrational’
forces. Consequently, they are unable to offer a complete account
of psychological distress, or of how this distress might be allevi-
ated. The task we face, then, is not simply to alleviate our
individual discomforts, but also to recognise that these are derived
from the wider ontological split that is tearing the world apart. 
In summary, then, our embodied distress has difficulty in artic-
ulating itself except as an essentially inexplicable ‘endogenous’
form of psychopathology, a necessarily ‘internal’ problem uncon-
nected with environmental conditions. In such ways are the
experiential and ecological consequences of environmental degra-
dation dissociated from one another, derailing the feedback loop
that would otherwise motivate action to prevent this degradation.
Thus the individual is reshaped to fit the industrialist landscape
so that feeling and bodily awareness become mute and direction-
less, and we become the tame, needy ‘consumers’ envisaged by
politicians and advertisers. The virtually inevitable distress that
the ‘normal’ self experiences as a result of these constrictions is
addressed by industrial society in ways that alienate us further
from the sources of our distress and enmesh us more completely
within this problematic style of selfhood. These ways include
psychotherapy, alcohol, addictive consumerism, narcissistic with-
drawal, and television sit-coms that, by encouraging us to laugh at
and identify with the predicaments of the alienated, the over-
weight, the alcoholic, and the strife-ridden, convey the message
that these problems ‘are just part of life’. Only by studying the
effects of industrialism across history and culture can we cultivate
what Roy Bhaskar has referred to as an ‘explanatory critique’
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(Collier, 1994: Ch. 6) which illuminates the sources of otherwise
inexplicable forms of subjective distress.
Living in a damaged world
‘The destruction of the earth’, says Robert Romanyshyn (1989,
p24), ‘is, for the incarnated human soul, whose entire history is
inseparable from and has been shaped by its place on the earth, an
unbearable reality’. One of the ways we make bearable this
unbearable reality is by our disembodiment; that is, by distancing
ourselves from our embodied being and the world it has evolved
to inhabit, and by an idealist focus on intellectual and social ‘real-
ities’, so that thought is used to control and discipline the body
and the feelings, intuitions, and awarenesses that the body
communicates. There is a vicious circle here, in which the idealist
denial of feeling and the collapse of a degraded, emotionally aban-
doned nature mutually reinforce one another within a single
pathological system. 
This neo-Cartesian ‘solution’ may make us feel more comfort-
able in the short term, as we ‘slip into a defensive mode designed
to contain anxiety, pessimism, and hopelessness’ (Schumaker,
2001, p157); but it sidesteps the underlying ecological problem by
effectively switching off those faculties that might alert us, in
effect restricting us to an exclusively cognitive awareness. A focus
on thinking that excludes feeling, therefore, amounts to a brack-
eting off of reality. As Edward Sampson (1981, p735) argues, our
culture’s emphasis on cognition suggests ‘people who are free to
engage in internal mental activity – to plan, decide, wish, think,
organise, reconcile, and transform conflicts and contradictions
within their heads – and yet who remain relatively impotent or
apparently unconcerned … about producing actual changes in
their objective … world’. 
At the individual level, this denial of reality reflects a delu-
sional system that could in principle be understood in terms of
Freud’s (1979, p223) view of the psychotic who, having lost touch
with reality, attempts to ‘make good the loss of reality … by the
creation of a new reality’. It is more than this, however: an entire
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civilisation is losing touch with reality, not simply a few aberrant
individuals. This civilisation is colonised by an ideological system
that is increasingly governed by its own internal dynamics and
attempts to deny our ultimate dependence on natural processes.
Furthermore, as this system accelerates its work of transforming
‘natural resources’ into commodities, we are drawn more deeply
into dependence on it as consumerism, the media, and a reliance
on centralised power generation, embodying its values and ratio-
nality, increasingly appear to define both the character of reality
and our own identities. At the same time, more ecologically
attuned lifestyles are made to seem bizarre, deviant, and ‘primi-
tive’. While mental health is often defined in terms of being in
touch with reality, what is generally taken for granted as ‘reality’
in this case is itself unreal, a façade that is out of touch with the
more profound, half-lost reality that we evolved to inhabit. As the
novelist J.G. Ballard (1995, p4) argues:
In the past we have always assumed that the external world around
us has represented reality, however confusing or uncertain, and
that the inner world of our minds, its dreams, hopes, ambitions,
represented the realm of fantasy and the imagination. These roles,
it seems to me, have been reversed. The most prudent and effec-
tive method of dealing with the world around us is to assume that
it is a complete fiction – conversely, the one small node of reality
left to us is inside our own heads.
I would argue, however, that it is not so much in our heads that
the residues of reality are to be found – our intellects have been
too deeply colonised for that – but rather in our bodies. Should
these embodied residues express themselves too insistently,
however, there are therapies available to help us quell the uncom-
fortable awarenesses that emerge. Cognitive-behavioural
therapists, for example, are fond of quoting Epictetus’s dictum
that ‘men are disturbed not by events, but by the views they take
of them’. As one textbook explains the philosophy behind this
type of therapy, ‘the idea one has about the world is more impor-
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tant than what is “real”’ (Ivey, Ivey, and Simek-Downing, 1980,
p303) The same authors (p325) say of ‘Reality Therapy’, to take
another example, that ‘people must act in a world that is imperfect
and not built to their specification and must act positively in this
world’. In other words, we must adapt to the world as we find it,
not troubling ourselves with memories of what the world was like
in the past, or visions of what it could be like in the future. In a
similar vein, programmes have appeared (see, for example,
Gilham and Reivich, 2004) designed to deal with the rising tide of
psychological distress by training individuals to engage in
thought patterns that are hopeful and optimistic. While it is not
my intention to reject such therapies and programmes, we also
need to ask what is depressing so many people in the first place,
and ask whether psychological intervention adequately addresses
their concerns.
Staring reality, and not least ecological reality, in the face can
indeed be unbearable, and it is therefore unsurprising that many
of us engage in mental gymnastics in order to avert the full
psychological impact of the destruction of the natural world. As
an example, consider the views of the late Julian Simon, an econ-
omist who for many years suffered from what he described as ‘a
deep depression’, and who became famous as a scourge of ‘doom-
saying’ environmentalists. Although Simon (1981, p9) claimed
that the origins of his ‘depression’ ‘had nothing to do with popu-
lation growth or the world’s predicament’, he notes on the same
page that
As I studied the economics of population and worked my way to
the views I now hold – that population growth, along with the
lengthening of human life, is a moral and material triumph, my
outlook for myself, for my family, and for the future of humanity
became increasingly more optimistic. Eventually I was able to pull
myself out of my depression.
Applying the principles of cognitive therapy to resolve his own
low mood, Simon became so enamoured with this approach that
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he later wrote a book about it. Summarising the principles
involved, he observed that ‘everyone knows the old saw about
seeing the glass half empty or half full. Even truer is that you can
often choose which glass to look at, a glass which is full or one
which is empty. Sadness and depression usually are optional’
(1993, p93). We can, he continued, ‘will [our] attention away from
depressing thoughts’, adding that ‘we have some choice over what
we pay attention to, just as we choose one television programme
over another’ (Simon, 1993, pp182, 168). But while this approach
can be valid and useful in overcoming unrealistically negative
interpretations, at least amongst the more articulate members of
society, it is equally clear that it can be enormously misleading if
it amounts to ‘cherry picking’ only those pieces of evidence that
support one’s own views and psychological needs. It is uncom-
fortably close to the attitude of those Austrian villagers who lived
near to, but refused to acknowledge the presence of, extermination
camps such as Mauthausen during the Holocaust, despite the
smell of burning flesh and the occasional wisps of human hair that
floated on the wind. As one woman put it, ‘I am happy when I hear
nothing and see nothing of it. As far as I am concerned, they aren’t
interned. That’s it. Over. It does not interest me at all’ (Cohen,
2001, p151). While such attitudes may permit one a degree of
psychological comfort, they do so at the price of a deeper and more
dangerous alienation from reality. 
As Simon himself admits, ‘a solid body of research in recent
years suggests that depressives are more accurate in their assess-
ments of the facts … than are non-depressives, who tend to have
an optimistic bias’ (Simon, 1993, p142). In fact, although this is
still a hotly debated topic, the evidence supporting the ‘depressive
realism’ hypothesis is now very substantial. There is also a
burgeoning literature demonstrating that ‘unrealistically opti-
mistic beliefs about the future are held by normal individuals with
respect to a wide variety of events’ (Taylor and Brown, 1994). As
Alloy, Albright, Abramson, and Dykman (1990, p72) summarise
this evidence in a review, the ‘findings of depressive realism and
nondepressive optimistic distortions suggest that the primary
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active ingredient in cognitive therapy may not be the enhance-
ment of realistic self-appraisal … but rather the training of
depressed clients to engage in the sort of optimistic biases and
illusions that nondepressives typically construct for themselves’.
Simon’s own writings seem to illustrate exactly this problem,
predicting that 
Mining of the moon will begin in 1990. The material from 50
million tons of moon rocks can be used to make solar-powered
satellites that will provide all the earth’s energy needs by 2000. …
space is an ideal location for many types of manufacturing,
including the making of electronics equipment. Space manufac-
turing can begin in the 1980’s, becoming a multi-billion dollar
business in a few decades (Simon, 1981, p89).
Later, Simon (1994) speculated that there are enough resources to
last the human race for ‘seven billion years’. Such ungrounded
fantasies can today be dismissed as wishful thinking; but the
popularity and influence of Simon’s books suggest that there is a
hunger for this sort of good news, not merely among the public as
a whole but, more worryingly, among those in powerful political
positions. Our capacity to adjust our thinking according to our
preferences and to ignore whatever is inconsistent with these pref-
erences, when socially legitimised by media and politicians, can
lead to policies and actions which are near-delusional. The sepa-
ration between spheres such as mental health and environmental
policy, however, prevents us from recognising this loss of contact
with reality and its possible consequences. From the perspective
of psychological health, for example, putting a positive ‘spin’ on a
situation may be viewed simply as an attempt to avoid depressive
feelings; but when translated into environmental policy, such
‘spin’ may have disastrous consequences. 
Cognitive behavioural therapy undoubtedly has a useful role to
play in challenging unrealistically negative thoughts; but realisti-
cally negative thoughts require a quite different type of action.
The former represent a depressive alienation from the world
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which can often be addressed through therapy; but the latter are
the result of an engagement with the world that demands action
outside the self. Viewed from this perspective cognitive therapy,
like consumerism, the entertainment industry, and sport, is one
weapon in industrial society’s arsenal designed to fend off the
awareness of our cultural, social, and environmental losses. As I
have argued in this paper, the increasingly common diagnosis of
‘depression’ is not simply a matter of mental hygiene, but has its
roots in the denial of those issues that are so threatening to our
civilisation that they are seldom acknowledged or discussed. In a
proportion of cases the melancholic may indeed have ‘a keener eye
for the truth than other people who are not melancholic’ (Freud,
1963, p246); and as a civilisation, we would do well to listen to the
truths hinted at by those feelings we tend to categorise as ‘depres-
sive’ rather than attempting, through medication or therapy, to
silence them. 
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